Sudan's conflict ... no signs of imminent end

News report by Mohammad Abdulaziz KHARTOUM, Jan 9 (KUNA) -- Sudan's conflict is showing no signs of imminent end in 2026 as the country is further sliding into a state of military stalemate and political fragmentation, accompanied by an unprecedented humanitarian crisis in its modern history.
Since the outbreak of fighting in April 2023, the conflict has evolved from a bilateral confrontation between the Sudanese Armed Forces and the Rapid Support Forces (RSF) into a multi-layered war.
It quickly shifted from a power struggle into a broad conflict fueled by competition over control of cities, resources and supply lines, with grave violations recorded.
The war has drained cities and led to a sustained collapse of services, while negotiation tracks between the two sides remain suspended amidst sporadic initiatives and absence of enforcement mechanisms or deterrent guarantees.
This has accelerated the cost of the war for civilians, including displacement of millions, collapse of health facilities and a food crisis likely to worsen in the coming months.
Darfur stands out as one of the most tragic fronts. A UN humanitarian mission visited the city of Al-Fasher for the first time since it fell to RSF forces in October 2025 and described the situation there as "harsh," with the city suffering acute shortages of food, shelter, medical care and clean water, alongside widespread violations.
This scene reflects the transformation of the conflict from a military confrontation into a war over how people can live within cities, such as cutting roads, disrupting markets, and targeting health and humanitarian infrastructure, effectively rendering any talk of de-escalation as mere ink on paper with no tangible impact on the ground.
Recent estimates indicate that between 12 and 13 million people have been displaced or become refugees since the war began, making the Sudanese crisis one of the largest displacement crises in the world today.
The World Food Program has warned that hunger is likely to worsen in February 2026 due to depleted stocks and continued fighting, underscoring the need to open a safe humanitarian corridor.
Therefore, the importance of settlement tracks and continued diplomatic engagement to resolve the crisis comes to the fore, particularly a trilateral plan proposed through the "Jeddah Platform," which includes ending the war, facilitating the entry of aid and charting a path toward a civilian transition.
Sudan's military leadership believes that 2026 may witness a shift in the balance of power based on field gains achieved by the army in recent months.
The recapture of Khartoum, Al-Jazeera and Sennar states, as well as parts of River Nile, White Nile and North Kordofan states, has enhanced the army's operational advantage and reduced the RSF's ability to maneuver deep inside the country.
Journalist Al-Taher Sati told the Kuwait News Agency (KUNA) that the army has not, in principle, rejected serious settlement initiatives, particularly those presented through the Jeddah forum, which included the withdrawal of forces from cities, the protection of civilians and the reduction of humanitarian harm.
Sati added that such flexibility remains conditional on preserving the unity of the state and monopolizing arms within a centralized military institution, arguing that any settlement that does not lead to the integration of the RSF into a unified structure would remain unacceptable.
In a contrasting assessment, political activist Najem Al-Deen Dreesa downplayed the ability of these gains to produce a decisive strategic shift, describing them as localized changes in the map of control.
Dreesa noted that the RSF still retains mobility and influence across parts of western Sudan, making it difficult that recent military progress means end of the conflict.
However, according to analysts, this military assessment faces far more complex political reality.
Analyst Izzat Khairy told KUNA that the conflict long ago moved beyond the logic of military decisiveness and entered a phase of "negative equilibrium," arguing that "field conditions entrench a state of military stalemate, making the war ongoing without a horizon for resolution." Dreesa said multiplicity of effective power centers on the ground and the absence of a realistic political framework have helped cement this balance, transforming it from a temporary military condition into an open political impasse.
In this context, Khairy pointed to the rising influence of local armed forces he described as "the guns of the regions," that formally align with major coalitions but are in practice focused on local control and territorial entrenchment.
Analysts warn, amidst these developments, that Sudan is approaching a scenario of "undeclared partition," with the RSF currently controlling Darfur and parts of Kordofan in western Sudan, while the army consolidates its control over the east and north, alongside the emergence of independent local forces within each sphere.
Khairy warned that the continuation of the war without a political settlement would boost separate zones of influence regardless of the party in control.
These developments also open the door to interconnected risks, including the widespread proliferation of weapons, rising irregular migration and re-formation of cross-border extremist networks amid growing security vacuums in western Sudan.
Observers believe that betting on a military victory or stability resulting from one side's superiority "lacks realism." Dreesa argued that the "absence of coordinated international will" limits the chances of reaching a settlement in the foreseeable future, suggesting that the crisis will continue to be treated as "a file to be managed rather than resolved." Khairy warns that failure to adopt a realistic approach in 2026 could push Sudan toward a higher-cost scenario in which the humanitarian catastrophe would be coupled with direct security threats to neighboring countries, and international partners increasingly concerned about the repercussions of Sudanese chaos.
Within this landscape, Khairy calls for the establishment of a coordinated international framework, provisionally referred to as the "Friends of the Quartet," aimed at moving beyond crisis management toward actual containment.
This would take into account realistic balances, multiple actors, the preservation of Sudan's unity, the reduction of arms flows, the curbing of irregular migration, the prevention of the resurgence of terrorism and the laying of groundwork for reconstruction.
Sudan in 2026 is not standing at a traditional crossroads but rather at the heart of a complex vortex of violence, division and institutional erosion. The more talk there is of peace plans, the wider the gap grows, and the absence of a clear mechanism to halt the fighting and end a protracted war becomes ever more apparent. (end) mam.maa